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I. INTRODUCTION
Latin America's interest in Japan has increased substantially
during the 1980s. Unfortunately for the region, Japan's priorities
have moved in the opposite direction-toward more advanced in-
dustrial countries, especially the United States and booming Asia.
Although the Latin American share of Japan's economic transac-
tions has fallen, the absolute value of those transactions has stayed
constant or even increased, thus providing significant help in the
face of an otherwise depressing international picture. In addition,
and contrary to this downward trend, some Latin American coun-
tries have successfully stepped up their relations with Japan, re-
garding both trade and foreign investment.
* Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Professor
Stallings is the author of Banker to the Third World: U.S. Portfolio Investments in Latin
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In view of the topic of the conference, this paper focuses on
Latin America's trade with Japan. It should first be recognized,
however, that trade has been the lagging sector of Japan's eco-
nomic relations with the region. As will be discussed in more detail
later on, trade relations have centered on Japanese exports of in-
dustrial goods in exchange for raw material. Although exports to
Latin America accounted for as much as eight percent of Japanese
trade in the 1950s, that figure dropped to around four percent dur-
ing the last half of the 1980s. Unlike the trade-dominated interac-
tions with the United States, Japan's relations with Latin America
have been investment and finance-dominated. This disparity is an-
alyzed in the first section of the paper which puts trade within the
overall context of the economic relations between Japan and Latin
America. The second and third sections look at quantitative trends
with respect to trade. Section four examines some "special fea-
tures" of Japanese trade, especially the general trading companies
or sogo shosha, the links between trade and investment, and gov-
ernmental attempts to promote trade. The fifth section briefly
compares U.S.-Latin American trade with the data already
presented for Japan. Finally, the paper outlines three possible sce-
narios for the future of trilateral trade and economic interaction
between the United States, Japan, and Latin America.
II. JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA
Japan's initial relations with Latin America came through im-
migration.1 Beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
over 300,000 Japanese citizens migrated to Latin America and it is
now estimated that well over one million people of Japanese line-
age live in the region. While the great majority is in Brazil,2 other
countries such as Mexico, Peru and Paraguay also have substantial
Japanese. populations. It is generally thought that the large group
of Japanese descendants in Brazil was one reason for Japan's
strong economic interest in that country in the post-World War II
period. A more recent demonstration of interest in Latin Ameri-
cans of Japanese ancestry was the publicity surrounding the elec-
tion of Alberto Fujimori as President of Peru and the ensuing pos-
1. For a summary discussion of immigration trends, see Kunimoto, Japanese Migration
to Latin America, in THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND LATIN AMERICA: A NEW TRILATERALISM
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE? (B. Stallings & G. Szekely eds.) (forthcoming).
2. Brazil counts over 800,000 people of Japanese descent, 18 INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOP-
mENT BANK 6 (March 1991). See Hollerman infra note 23, at 27 n.3.
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sibility of large-scale aid to that country. Since this original influx
of immigrants, Japan has developed through trade, direct invest-
ment, and both public and private financing, multi-faceted rela-
tions with Latin America.
A. Direct Foreign Investments
Currently Japan has some $32 billion of direct foreign invest-
ment (DFI) in the region, which represents 17 percent of Japanese
direct investment worldwide. s While this figure has remained more
or less constant for several decades, the 1980s have seen an impor-
tant-and negative-change in the composition of both U.S. and
Japanese foreign investment in Latin America. Two parallel
processes have been occurring.
Principally, the bulk of Japanese investment has shifted away
from mainland Latin America toward the tax havens of the Carib-
bean and flag-of-convenience companies of Panama. At the same
time, there has been a move away from the productive sectors to-
ward services. In the 1970s, for example, 46 percent of Japanese
direct foreign investment was in manufacturing (mainly in Brazil
and Mexico). Another 30 percent was in agriculture, fishing, min-
ing, and construction. Only 24 percent was in services, including
finance and transportation. By the second half of the 1980s, those
figures had changed dramatically. Manufacturing was down to 6.5
percent, other productive sectors had dropped to 1.4 percent, while
services had ballooned to 92 percent. This spectacular increase was
due mainly to flag-of-convenience shipping in Panama and off-
shore financial services in the Caribbean. If we eliminate these two
categories, Japanese direct investment stock in Latin America
drops from $32 billion to around $10 billion or only 5 percent of
worldwide Japanese investments.
Of this $10 billion of "real" investment, over half is in Brazil
with iron ore and steel as the single largest area of Japanese in-
vestment, followed by machinery and textile. Mexico is the second
major site of "real" Japanese DFI in Latin America. There, the
automobile industry is the key sector, followed by mining and
3. Data on direct foreign investment by Japan are kept by the Ministry of Finance.
Unfortunately, they consist of companies' intentions to invest, as reported to the Ministry.
No data on a regional basis exist for actual investment. Likewise, data on reinvestment are
not available. My assumption in using the data for "accumulated investment" is that those
investments that are declared but not actually are more or less offset by reinvestment.
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steel. Despite the recent years of devastation, Peru's mining sector
still retains significant Japanese capital. Finally, it should be
added that several promising investments have emerged in the last
year. New capital was injected into Chile's copper mining and into
its paper and forestry sector. New investments will also be made in
aluminum production in Brazil and Venezuela, as well as in the
automobile industry in Mexico and perhaps Brazil. Whether these
recent announcements are the beginning of Japan's new confidence
in Latin America remains to be seen.
B. Financial Involvement
The other area where Japan is a major presence is with respect
to Latin America's foreign debt. By some measures, Japan is now
the leading creditor for the region as far as medium and long-term
private bank loans are concerned. Official Japanese statistics for
1989 show that Japanese banks held $46 billion of Latin debt,
which would represent 18 percent of total Japanese bank loans."
While U.S. government data shows that U.S. banks hold $36 bil-
lion of Latin American loans, differences in accounting procedures
make these figures difficult to compare. Nonetheless, if Japan is
not Latin America's largest creditor, it is certainly the second larg-
est. While U.S. banks have been withdrawing from the Latin
American market since the debt crisis began in 1982,1 the Japanese
banks have continued to participate. Thus, the decreasing U.S. in-
volvement in the region has resulted in a dramatic increase of Ja-
pan's share of the Latin American financial market. This trend,
however, seems to have been reversed during 1990. Japanese banks
have become more conservative and have elected to take write-
downs on their loans rather than provide new money. At the same
time, the U.S. has renewed its economic interest in the region with
the implementation of the Brady Plans for Mexico and Venezuela.
In addition to private finance, the Japanese have also provided
important public-sector credits to Latin America. This is accom-
plished both directly through bilateral arrangements and indirectly
4. On debt and the role of the banks, see Stallings, The Reluctant Giant: Japan and
the Latin American Debt Crisis, 22 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 1 (1990); Horizaka, Japanese Banks
and Latin American Debt Problems, 4 LATIN AM. STUD. Occasional Papers, (GEo. U. 1990).
5. And this, despite repeated attempts by the IMF and the Federal Reserve to keep all
banks involved in rescheduling negotiations.
6. The Brady Plan, named after Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, proposes debt-for-
equity exchanges to allay Latin America's debt crisis.
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through contributions to the multilateral agencies, including the
Inter-American Development Bank. Japanese public funds are dis-
tributed through four main agencies. The first two, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Japanese International Cooperation
Agency (JICA), handle grants and technical assistance. Although
by definition there is no outstanding debt through this source, an
idea of its importance can be seen by the latest annual figures. In
1988, Latin America received about $280 million in grant and tech-
nical assistance which amounts respectively to 6.5 percent and 13
percent of the total aid issued by these two agencies.'
The second channel for public monies is the Overseas Eco-
nomic Cooperation Fund (OECF), which distributes soft loans to
developing countries. The interest rate on the loans is 2.6 percent
with a maturity of 28 years. As of March 31, 1990, Latin America
had loans outstanding to OECF in the amount of $1.6 billion, rep-
resenting about four percent of the Fund's total loans." Typically
Latin America has not been eligible for much money from this
source since it is aimed only at the poorest countries (the current
per capita income ceiling is $2200). Although arrears must first be
cleared, OECF officials say that they intent to increase in the com-
ing years both Latin America's share of funds as well as the abso-
lute amount. This source will become increasingly important since
Japan has now displaced the United States as the leading supplier
of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and will distribute some
$50 billion over the next five years.
The biggest source of public funds for Latin America is the
Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM), although that name is
somewhat misleading. Like its sister organizations in the United
States and Europe, JEXIM began in order to promote Japanese
exports. Its most important function today, however, is to provide
"untied direct loans" to governments of middle-income developing
countries at rates similar to those of the World Bank. Latin
America's $6.9 billion loans outstanding to Japan's Export-Import
Bank represent almost one-fifth of JEXIM's total loans.' If we
combine the OECF and JEXIM funds, Latin America accounts for
close to ten percent of the debt owed to the Japanese public sector.
JEXIM and OECF are also the two organizations responsible
7. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ODA, Japan's Official Development Assistance, 1989
ANNUAL REPORT (1990).
8. See OVERSEAS ECON. Coop. FUND, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT (1990).
9. THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF JAPAN, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT (1990).
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for disbursing loans under Japan's "recycling fund" measures of
which Latin America has become a leading recipient. This fund,
now in its second phase, will provide $65 billion by its conclusion
in 1992. A substantial part will go directly to the international fi-
nancial institutions, but JEXIM will distribute $23.5 billion and
OECF $12.5 billion, through co-financing and direct loans. As of
mid-1990, JEXIM had committed 29 percent of its "recycling
fund" loans to Latin America while OECF committed 16 percent.'0
The preceding discussion has concerned stocks of Japanese
capital in the region: 17 percent of Japanese direct investment, 18
percent of total private bank debt, and 10 percent of public-sector
debt are located in Latin America. These numbers contrast sharply
with the trade figures since Latin America accounts for less than
four percent of Japanese trade. If we look at flows over the past
five years, rather than stocks, some similar results emerge (see Ta-
ble 1). In general over that period, Latin America has become less
important to Japan, displaced by the United States, Southeast
Asia, and increasingly Europe. Conversely, Japan has become more
important to Latin America as other sources of capital have dried
up. In particular, Table 1 suggests that Japan has provided about
$9 billion per year on a net basis compared to less than half that
amount from the United States.
III. JAPANESE TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA
Trade between Japan and Latin America has never been of
major importance for either side. Nevertheless, it has provided
each partner with an avenue to diversify trade relations so as to be
less dependent on its principal markets and suppliers. According to
Japanese figures, total trade with Latin America (exports plus im-
ports) was running at about $17.5 billion in 1989, representing 3.6
percent of Japan's total trade." After peaking to almost ten per-
10. The best overall report on the recycling fund is Kinoshita, Japan's Current 'Re-
cycling Measures:' Their Background, Performance, and Prospects, ExPoRT-IMPoRT BANK
OF JAPAN (October 1988). Updated information comes from unpublished data from JEXIM
and OECF.
11. Trade data used here are from the IMF. DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTIC YEAROOK
(various years). They are based on Japanese government statistics; figures from the Latin
American side vary, even in the same publication. The IMF figures for Japan's Western
Hemisphere trade also differ slightly from those published by Japan's Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry. See MINSTRY INr'L TRADE & INDUSTRY (MITI). WHIrE PAPERS
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE (JETRO trans. 1990). The main difference concerns inclusion of
countries; the MITI figures include areas that are not independent of which the most impor-
[Vol. 22:2-3
TRADE WITH JAPAN
cent of Japan's total import/export in the mid-1950s, Latin
America's share of Japanese trade has been consistently decreasing
(see Table 2). Despite the falling share, however, the nominal value
climbed rapidly until the early 1980s. Since then, there has been a
stagnation; only in 1989 did the total value of trade exceed the
previous peak in 1981. Of course, the real value remains well below
the peak level of 1981.
The balance of trade between Japan and Latin America has
shifted over the period. During the 1950s and 1960s, Japan was
running a small deficit as its import demand exceeded the goods it
was able to sell in the region. In the early 1970s, Japanese imports
increased but were still outpaced by exports. Initially the resulting
imbalance owed to the availability of borrowed resources in Latin
America, but the pattern continued even after the debt crisis be-
gan in 1982. Up until 1987, the Japanese surplus was running at
about $2 billion per year. As of 1989, it had fallen to about $200
million, mainly because of an increase in Latin American exports
(see Table 2).
The trade figures, and their country distribution within Latin
America, are confused by Japan's relations with Panama. Since the
mid-1970s, Japan has been using Panama as an important registry
for its shipping fleet. Thus, sales of ships to Japanese companies in
Panama have inflated trade figures for Latin America by a sub-
stantial amount. During the 1980s, Japanese data (also used by in-
ternational organizations) show Panama as the recipient of $26.4
billion of Japanese exports or one third of Japan's total export to
Latin America. The Panamanian figures, by contrast, do not in-
clude the shipping exports, since they have little or nothing to do
with the Panamanian economy. These massive exports to Panama
also distort the trade balance calculations since there is no corre-
sponding inflation of imports. Without the very large surplus in
Panama, Japanese trade with Latin America is in deficit.12
Aside from Panama, Japan's largest trade partner in Latin
tant is Puerto Rico. The MITI data, used in the paper for sectoral analysis, show trade for
1989 of about $18 billion.
12. On the shipping trade and Panama's relations with Japan in general, see Elton,
Japan and Panama: The Role of the Panama Canal, in THE UmTED STATES, JAPAN AND
LATIN AMERICA: A NEW TRILATERALISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 1 at -.
Elton explains the link between large investments and the trade figures. Since the Japanese
definition of direct investment includes loans, it is loans to the shipping companies (re-




America has been Brazil. In 1989, Brazilian trade accounted for 25
percent of Japan's total involvement in the region-29 percent if
the Panamanian ships are excluded. Typically, Brazil has had a
large surplus in its Japanese trade balance. Mexico comes second
with 21 percent of Japan's Latin American trade. The balance of
Japanese-Mexican trade in the last decade has depended heavily
on the price of oil. In 1988-89, Mexico had a small deficit with Ja-
pan. The third largest partner is Chile with 11 percent of Japan's
Latin American trade, with a large surplus in Chile's favor. Others,
in order of importance, include Colombia (4.5 percent), Venezuela
(4.3 percent), Argentina (3.4 percent), Peru (3.3 percent), Ecuador
(1.3 percent), and Honduras (1.1 percent).
The content of Japanese-Latin American trade has been and
remains a typical "colonial" pattern. Japan imports raw materials
from Latin America and exports industrial goods in return. While
U.S. trade with Latin America has shifted away from this pattern,
as will be discussed below, Japanese trade has not changed very
much. A superficial look at Table 3 may give a mistaken impres-
sion of Japan's imports from Latin America. While it appears that
41 percent of Japanese imports from the region are "manufactured
goods" this figure includes not only finished goods, but also what
have traditionally been called "semi-manufactured goods." Thus, a
closer look shows that about three quarters of these "manufac-
tured goods" are in fact semi-processed metals. Turning to look at
trade patterns in more detail, Table 3 shows the main categories as
of 1989. Some 92 percent of Japanese exports to Latin America are
"heavy and chemical industry" products. Of that amount, the larg-
est share (46 percent of the total) is transport equipment. Once
again the shipping trade with Panama creates confusion since more
than half of the transport category is comprised of ships. Aside
from that, general machinery, electrical instruments, and motor ve-
hicles are the most important items.
Imports from Latin America are more varied. Raw materials
account for 26 percent, with iron ore as the most important item.
Foodstuffs are 20 percent, with coffee as the largest single import.
Finally, petroleum is another 12 percent. As mentioned above,
"manufactured goods" appear as the largest category. Breaking
down this figure, however, shows that machinery and textiles pro-
vide three percent and steel another nine percent while the re-
mainder is mostly semi-processed metals. Exporters of manufac-
tured goods, rather than semi-manufactured, are mainly Brazil,
[Vol. 22:2-3
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Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela. In general, however, Latin
American countries have had little success in competing with Asia
for the growing Japanese market for manufactured products. How-
ever, despite Latin America's low overall share of Japan's market,
there are specific items for which the region is an important sup-
plier. According to unpublished data provided by the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI), Latin America provides
at least 20 percent of Japan's imports of seven food products and a
number of raw materials. The largest items include iron ore ($960
million, 30 percent of Japanese imports), coffee ($587 million, 66
percent), inwrought copper ($574 million, 34 percent), ferro-alloys
($285 million, 23 percent), silver ($174 million, 76 percent), pig
iron ($128 million, 36 percent), emeralds ($102 million, 28 percent),
forage ($101 million, 55 percent), and salt ($95 million, 46 percent).
Notwithstanding the isolated products above, Latin America is
not a very important trade partner for Japan. The trade picture
changes, however, when studied from the Latin American side. For
the 19 Latin American countries, Japan accounted for a little over
eight percent of their trade in 1989. In other words, Japan is about
twice as important for the Latin American countries as they are for
Japan. Japan is more significant as an exporter-10 percent of
Latin American exports-than as an importer (less than 7 percent
of Latin American imports originate in Japan).
A more detailed look at the region's exports show that Japan
is, after the U.S., the second largest export market for five Latin
American countries. They include Chile (12.5 percent of exports
are sold to Japan), Brazil (12.2 percent), Peru (11.9 percent), Hon-
duras (9.8 percent), and Mexico (7.1 percent). For Colombia, Japan
is the third most important market with 5.2 percent of their ex-
ports. Similarly for imports, Japan is the second largest provider,
again following the United States, for six countries: Ecuador (13.9
percent), Colombia (10.9 percent), Panama (10.6 percent), Hondu-
ras (9.0 percent), Haiti (5.4 percent), and Mexico (5.3 percent). For
five others, Japan is third most important: Dominican Republic
(14.4 percent), Paraguay (13 percent), Chile (7.7 percent), Costa
Rica (6.7 percent), and Brazil (6.6 percent). All data are for 1989.1'
Although the region's share of Japanese trade has fallen, some
Latin American countries have successfully improved their rela-
tions with Japan. For example, between 1986 and 1989 Chilean ex-
13. Calculated from IMF, DIREcTIoN oF TRADE STATISTIC YEARBOOK (1990).
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ports to Japan increased almost threefold from $533 million to $1.3
billion. While Chile's traditional copper export has fallen, despite
the high world prices, non-traditional goods-especially fish, fruits,
and forestry products-have grown rapidly. Mexico also has been
trying to increase non-traditional exports. In the last year alone,
non-oil exports to Japan have increased by 14 percent.
IV. SPECIAL FEATURES OF JAPANESE TRADE
Three special features are found in Japanese trade with Latin
America. First is the role of the trading companies. Second is the
close link between trade and investment, in which the trading com-
panies are heavily involved. And third, is the important role of the
government in promoting trade.
Behind the quantitative data on Japanese-Latin American
trade lies the fascinating story of Japan's trade process. The key
actors are the giant general trading companies or sogo shosha
which are among the most powerful companies in Japan.15 Some of
the sogo shosha date back to the last century and were central
figures in the zaibatsu (conglomerates), which led Japan's dra-
matic industrialization drive in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. The most powerful sogo shosha, like the zaibatsu
themselves, were broken up during the postwar U.S. occupation.
By the 1950s, however, U.S. opinion shifted and the trading com-
panies were encouraged to regroup. After various mergers and divi-
sions, there are now generally considered to be nine main sogo
shosha at the top of the trading sector with hundreds of smaller,
more specialized firms. The nine companies are huge even by
American standards. Their trading exchanges in the 1989 fiscal
year ranged from $35 billion (kanematsu) to $143 billion
(Sumitomo). The six largest have an average of 150 international
offices in over 80 countries in addition to their 50 or so offices in
Japan.
The general trading companies have three principal functions.
First is the obvious role of intermediary. The companies purchase
goods of all kinds-"noodles to missiles" in the popular par-
14. Data provided by the Chilean and Mexican embassies in Tokyo.
15. Several analyses of the sago shosha are available in English. The most useful is
Kojima & Ozawa, Japan's General Trading Companies: Merchants of Economic Develop-
ment, (OECD ed. 1984). For a more historical analysis, see also Y. KUNIO, SoGo SHOSHA: THE
VANOUARD OF JAPANESE ECONOMY (Oxford University Press, 1982).
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lance-and sell them to clients, primarily in Japan but also in
third countries. In the process they may transport and warehouse
these goods thereby increasing efficiency and profit. Second, the
sogo shosha act as bankers. Much of the short-term trade credit is
provided by the trading companies themselves. As will be dis-
cussed below, they also provide significant amounts of equity capi-
tal to secure suppliers. Finally, the trading companies gather infor-
mation of many types: social and political as well as economic.
Some say this information is far superior to that of the Japanese
government itself. Large amounts of money are now being devoted
to improve communication equipment to process and transmit this
information through the trading companies' vast international
network."0
Although the sogo shosha were involved in international trade
almost since the beginning, most of their initial efforts focused on
the needs of the Japanese market. Thus, their primary activity in-
volved purchasing raw materials abroad and selling the output. In
the 1970s, however, large Japanese companies departed from their
original focus and began to develop their own sales operations and
financing. This led many economists to predict that the trading
companies would disappear. Quite to the contrary, they transferred
a substantial part of their operations abroad, especially to Third
World countries and in the process increasingly became organizers
of projects as well as sales agents.
Several of the sogo shosha set up offices in Latin America
before World War II, but it was really in the postwar period that
they became major actors in the region. Since the larger companies
tend to move in tandem, it is possible to trace waves of movement
into Latin America. For example, in the 1950s, the trading compa-
nies established themselves in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. In
the 1960s, they entered Chile, Peru and Venezuela. Colombia and
Panama followed in the 1970s, and Ecuador came in the 1980s.
Many other countries have representatives or liaison offices. While
these offices cannot formally sign contracts or accumulate profits,
they are a crucial part of the international network of the firms.
Indeed the international span of operations is one of the key char-
acteristics of the sogo shosha. Table 4 shows the location of trading
company offices in Latin American. As can be seen, the six largest
16. See Kojima & Ozawa supra note 15. While Kojima and Ozawa list these three cate-
gories, they are merely reporting what all economists and business people in Japan say
about the role of the trading companies.
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companies have offices in thirteen or fourteen Latin American
countries while the smaller ones cover from five to nine countries.
Trading remains the main activity of the sogo shosha in Latin
America. However, despite having 10 percent of their offices in the
region, largest companies average only $2-3 billion in transactions
per year. this represents approximatively 2 percent of their yearly
trade. In a typical situation, one-third of that amount is exports
from Japan, another third is imports to Japan, and the final third
is offshore or third-country trade. This means that over half of the
yearly $18 billion of Japanese-Latin American trade is handled by
the nine sogo shosha. More surprising is that as much as 10 per-
cent of total Latin American trade worldwide is also handled by
these same firms.
17
There are two main types of Japan-Latin American trade not
handled by the sogo shosha. First, the major Japanese corporations
with subsidiaries in Latin America generally export and import
their own goods. This is an extension of the process that took place
in Japan itself as manufacturing firms became increasingly inde-
pendent of the trading companies. Second, large Latin American
firms-especially state corporations-also deal directly with cus-
tomers in Japan. Examples include Petroleos Mexicanos
(PEMEX), which sells about $1 billion of oil each year to a Japa-
nese consortium of refiners; Companhia Vale do Rio Doce
(CVRD), the Brazilian firm that sells iron ore and other raw
materials to Japan; Corporaci6n del Cobre (CODELCO), which
sells Chilean copper; and Mineria Peruana Comercial
(MINPECO) that distributes various Peruvian mineral products.
In fact, of the large ticket raw materials that Latin America ex-
ports to Japan the trading companies only play a major role in the
export of Colombian coffee and Mexican salt.
The sogo shosha are crucial in three areas: Exports of non-
traditional goods to Japan, third-country trade in general, and in-
vestment in products that are then exported. The sogo shosha
have been particularly important for small and medium-sized
firms-both in helping such Japanese firms operate abroad and
helping foreign firms trade with Japan. The Mexican government,
for example, says that the trading companies handle almost all ex-
ports of Mexican manufactured goods. Chilean fruits, seafood and
forestry products are also exported by the sogo shosha. Likewise,
17. Based on confidential interviews at the major trading companies.
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the traders promote exports of machinery from Brazil, textiles
from Central America, and many other new products.
During the 1980s, third-country trade has been of increasing
importance for the sogo shosha in Latin America. As the invest-
ment market in the region slowed down, fewer imports were re-
quired from Japan. It was also extremely difficult for Latin Ameri-
can goods other than raw materials to compete on the Japanese
market. Thus, in its 1990 annual survey, the trading company
C.Itoh reported that 45 percent of its Latin American business had
now become third-country trade. Unpublished data from other
sogo shosha suggest figures ranging up to one-third. Most of this
trade is between Latin America and the United States but goods
are also shipped from Latin America to Asia and Europe. All of the
trading firms declare that an increase in third-country 'trade is
among their goals for the 1990s.
Finally, the sogo shosha are at the center of the link between
trade and investment which has always been a dominant charac-
teristic of Japan's international activities. The traders themselves
have become equity investors, often buying a small interest in
firms offering good possibilities for export. Having such a share en-
ables the trading companies to bring about changes not only to
increase the firms' profitability but also to improve their products,
so as to make them more marketable. For example, one company
reports bringing not only a substantial rise in productivity in the
automobile industry of a Latin American country, but also suffi-
cient improvements in agricultural products to enable them to
compete on the Japanese market. While the trading companies
usually hope to make profits from their investments, they are also
interested in generating future trade opportunities.
The Japanese government also plays a crucial role in interna-
tional trade and investment. Perhaps the best known format is the
so-called "national project." While there are many definitions of
this term, its crucial aspect is the link between the public sector
(usually through OECF) and local private industry, including the
participation of a wide variety of private-sector Japanese firms.
The trading companies often act as organizers of the projects.
Three important examples of such cooperation are located in Bra-
zil: Cerrado, an agricultural complex that began in Minas Gerais;
Cenibra, a paper and pulp project in the same region; and Alu-




Another government role is to provide investment insurance
through the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).
Like the participation of the OECF in the national projects de-
scribed above, MITI insurance functions as a governmental ap-
proval or disapproval of particular projects and countries. Only
very large firms or projects that. are particularly lucrative will go
ahead without MITI insurance. Another way in which the govern-
ment has stimulated trade in the past is through Official Develop-
mental Assistance (ODA). That is, ODA projects-often promoted
by the trading companies themselves-generally revolve around
the guarantee that the equipment needed for the project will be
purchased from Japanese firms. More recently, the practice of tied
loans has ended and the link between trade and ODA has weak-
ened. Since Latin America gets very little Japanese Developmental
Assistance, this link is not very important. More relevant in the
past were the JEXIM loans to promote Japanese exports. These
loans have also dried up, in response to frictions arising from Ja-
pan's trade surpluses. Now JEXIM loans to Latin America are
mostly untied. In general, the public-private links that spurred
trade in the past are on the decline. This, in turn, has softened
private support for lending to developing countries.
V. COMPARISONS BETWEEN U.S. AND JAPANESE TRADE WITH LATIN
AMERICA
Japan's economic relations with Latin America differ substan-
tially from that of the United States. First and foremost U.S. trade
in the region is much more important quantitatively to both the
United States and Latin America. Equally different are the
sectoral composition U.S.-Latin American trade and the trade pro-
cess itself. Obviously there is no U.S. equivalent of the sogo shosha
and the U.S. government plays only a small role in the promotion
of trade. Instead, links between trade and investment come
through the multinational investors themselves.
Table 5 shows long-term trends in U.S.-Latin American trade
in the postwar period. A comparison with Table 2 reveals two in-
teresting points. The United States carries on much more of its
trade with Latin America than does Japan. In 1989, for example,
12.7 percent of U.S. trade-some $109 billion-was with western
hemisphere countries compared to only 3.7 percent for Japan or
$18 billion. Latin America was slightly more important as a market
for U.S. exports-13.5 percent of U.S. exports-as it was a source
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of imports-12.2 percent of U.S. imports. Again, these numbers
contrast sharply with the Japanese trade figures. These differences
are not at all surprising, however, given the geographical and his-
torical ties between the two markets. More interesting, therefore, is
the major similarity in the two tables: the declining importance of
Latin America for both the United States and Japan. In fact, the
timing pattern is also very similar. In both cases, the peak of Latin
American participation was in the 1950s. There has been a fairly
steady decline ever since, although the drop became more pro-
nounced in the late 1980s. These trends, of course, are matched in
other areas. Two decades ago, Anibal Pinto was already writing
about the increasing marginalization of Latin America."8 The trade
component of this marginalization is consistent with the import-
substitution development strategy followed by Latin America and
the "export pessimism" that accompanied it. Since the Asian coun-
tries were promoting trade-or at least exports-at the same time,
they eventually overtook Latin America in share of world trade.
The four East-Asian NICs (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singa-
pore) now supply a larger volume of U.S. imports than do all Latin
American countries combined.
The relative importance of individual Latin American nations
provides another interesting contrast. Even leaving aside the
anomalous situation of Panama, the differences remain significant.
For Japan, Brazil is the most important trade partner. With the
exception of Mexico (a close second behind Brazil), almost all of
Japan's trade is with South America. For the United States, Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean dominate largely the rest of the
region. Mexico alone accounted for 48 percent of U.S. trade with
Latin America in 1989. The rest of Central America and the Carib-
bean account for another 15 percent while giant Brazil, for exam-
ple, represented only 13 percent of the total U.S. trade with the
region. These geographical differences might provide the basis for
complementary relations between the United States and Japan, or
for increased friction. We will return to these issues in the conclud-
ing section.
The sectoral composition of trade is yet another area of con-
trast between Latin American economic relations with the United
States and Japan. A couple of decades ago, the United States basi-
18. Pinto, Economic Relations Between Latin America and the United States: Some
Implications and Perspectives, in LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES: THE CHANGING
POLITICAL REALITIEs 100 (J. Cotler & R. Fagen eds. 1972).
1991]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
cally supplied industrial goods to Latin America in exchange for
raw materials, much like the Japanese do today. That pattern,
however, changed substantially during the 1980s. A comparison be-
tween Table 6 and Table 3 highlights these changes. For example,
raw materials represent only 4 percent of U.S. imports from Latin
America, while they represent more than a quarter of Japanese im-
ports from the region. Similarly, 27 percent of U.S. imports consist
of machinery as opposed to 2.5 percent for Japan. These differ-
ences appear also on the export side where the U.S. exports a
much smaller percentage of machinery than the Japanese. To some
extent, of course, the trade differences between the United States
and Japan are due to the greater natural resources of the former.
The interesting question still remains, however, why has Latin
America been so successful at exporting light manufactured prod-
ucts to the United States while being almost completely shut out
of the Japanese market?
Finally, there are differences in the trade process that should
be briefly mentioned. Clearly there are no U.S. equivalents of Ja-
pan's trading companies. The key intermediaries are the producing
multinationals themselves. That is, intra-company trade is a major
source of imports to the United States from Latin America. Some
of this is done in connection with special facilities set up in Central
America and the Caribbean such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative
and Mexico's maquiladora program. Japan has also been quick to
take advantage of the latter. Figures vary, but probably about 50
Japanese firms have assembly plants along the Mexican border to
facilitate exports to the United States.' 9
Ironically, the U.S. government is not active in promoting U.S.
exports, to Latin America or elsewhere, despite the declared need
to close the trade gap. Export-Import Bank loans have ground to a
halt. Likewise, U.S.AID is no longer a trade stimulus (except for
certain Central American countries). Indeed, it is the Japanese
government that is trying to stimulate U.S. exports to Latin
America. This is an open aim of the "recycling fund." The idea
being that if Latin American countries have more foreign currency,
they will use it to buy goods from the United States and perhaps
take some pressure off Japan. Whether this is true or not is open
to question, but the idea alone is interesting to say the least.
19. JAPANESE EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (JETRO), JAPANESE DIRECT FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT (JETRO Ed. 1990) (in Japanese).
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VI. SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE
Moving from the past to the future, there are three main trade
scenarios involving Japan, the United States, and Latin America.
They include a Western Hemisphere trade bloc with little role for
Japan; a Japanese "headquarters strategy" in which Japan dis-
places the United States, at least in South America; and some type
of "cooperative" U.S.-Japanese approach.
The extreme version of the trade bloc scenario, which has been
under discussion for several years, envisions three major trade ar-
eas: Europe, East Asia, and the Americas. The Americas portion of
that plan took a more concrete form with Carlos Salinas' proposal
for a U.S.-Mexican Free Trade Area. Combined with the existing
free-trade agreement with Canada, this would provide a market of
over 300 million people. The Mexican proposal was further ex-
panded-although in an extremely vague way-by George Bush's
"Enterprise for the Americas"20 Initiative. Since then, the United
States has agreed to pursue free trade talks with several Latin
American countries, but clearly the Mexican proposal is the most
immediate. The future of trade with Latin America will depend
largely on whether the U.S. and Mexican congresses ratify the pro-
posed union and whether this agreement will later be extended
further south. In any case, even if such agreements are concluded
it is not clear what impact, if any, those external barriers will have
on Japan and others.
While I think there is no better than a fifty percent chance
that the Mexican agreement will be ratified, I will nevertheless
concentrate my remarks on the potential impact that such an
agreement would have on Japanese trade with both the U.S. and
Latin America. Although Japan officially supports the Mexican
agreement, the Japanese investors are privately suspicious that the
intention, or at least the result, will be to limit their participation
in the resulting market. I have heard some off-the record com-
ments to this effect, but a recent article in the Wall Street Jour-
nal21 made the position public. Japanese investors are fearful that
the agreement will impose a stiff local content law for duty-free
20. President Bush's Address on "Enterprise for the Americas" Proposal and Accom-
panying White House Fact Sheet, Released June 27, 1990 (Text), Daily Rep. for Execs.
(BNA) No.125, at M-1 (June 28, 1990).
21. Japanese Investors Worry as U.S., Mexico Plan Talks on Free Trade, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 19, 1990, at 6, col. 1 (Asian ed.).
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exports in either direction. It would also likely eliminate the duty-
free imports of inputs that the maquiladoras now enjoy. According
to the president of Nissan Mexicana, many Japanese would invest
directly in the United States rather than in Mexico if confronted
by such changes.
Nearly the opposite position has been put forward by Dr.
Gabriel Szekely, an expert on Japanese-Mexican relations.
2
Szekely argues that the only way for Mexico to attract Japanese
trade and investment is by establishing a free trade area with the
United States. At the same time, he also claims that Japanese par-
ticipation is a crucial factor to make an agreement work. Szekely's
perspective shades off into the third (cooperative) scenario. I con-
sider the exclusive version of the trade bloc theory to be highly
unlikely, despite the recent collapse of the GATT negotiations. An
"Americas bloc" is simply not an attractive alternative for the
United States. Even if stronger than expected protectionism
emerges in Europe, a more likely response would be a very broad
Pacific Basin strategy.
The second scenario, with Japan displacing the United States
in Latin America, has been most forcefully advanced by Prof. Leon
Hollerman.' s Using Brazil as an example, Hollerman makes a two-
fold argument. First, he points out that the United States and Bra-
zil are basically economic competitors, while Japan and Brazil have
complementary economies. Moreover, the United States has alien-
ated Brazil on many issues, while Japan is perceived as more coop-
erative. Second, Hollerman outlines a "headquarters" strategy,
whereby Japan would increase its links with Brazil at the expense
of the United States. In particular, Japan would take a multilateral
approach, limiting its trade with the United States while helping
Brazil to expand its U.S. exports. The trading companies would
play a key role in the process. "The ultimate implication for the
United States is that instead of being confronted by Japan, it will
be outflanked by Japan in accordance with the headquarters-coun-
try strategy."'
4
22. Szekely, Japan, Mexico, and the United States: An Unusual Trilateral Relation-
ship, in THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND LATIN AMERICA: A NEW TRILATERALISM IN THE WEST-
ERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 1 at _.
23. Hollerman, The Role of Brazil in Japan's Economic Strategy: Implications for the
United States, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 25 (1990). (This paper was originally presented at the
University of California San Diego conference on Japan and Latin America, (April 1990)).
24. Id. at 27; see also L. HOLLERMAN, JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRATEGY IN BRAZIL: CHALLENGE
FOR THE UNITED STATES (Lexington Books 1988).
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I also find this scenario unlikely. My own interviews in Japan
over the past three years find little interest in Latin America. Most
of Japan's official activity in the region is to protect its relationship
with the United States. As far as the private sector is concerned, I
have met no one who expects a return to the level of activity of the
1970s. The banks have opted out; non-financial investors are re-
taining their holdings but not expanding except in very special cir-
cumstances like Mexico's maquiladoras and Chile's natural re-
sources. Of course, if growth and stability return Japan will be
present. There is little inclination, however, to help bring about
these changes. Hollerman is correct in his focus on third-country
trade, but it seems more a defensive strategy than an offensive one.
The United States and Japan officially endorse the third sce-
nario, that of cooperation. Although what it involves is not exactly
clear, the preferred U.S. version would be for Japan to provide the
money and for the United States to spend it. Clearly this approach
would be unacceptable to the Japanese over the long run although
this is not unlike what the U.S. has been doing over the last several
years. Ultimately, if Japan is to continue to provide resources, it
must also have a say in how they are spent. When that comes
about, conflicts are bound to emerge because Japan's views about
development and how to achieve it are different from those of the
United States. At the moment, the Japanese limit themselves to
expressing "puzzlement" over the U.S.-approved strategies that
most Latin American governments have adopted over the last sev-
eral years. These strategies are very different from the one that
proved so successful for Japan and its neighbors in East Asia.
The Japanese claim to be waiting for some serious indication
of U.S. interest in Latin America. After all, Japan considers that
Latin America is in the U.S. sphere of influence. If the United
States takes the lead, they will be willing to assist. The form and




Table 1. US and Japanese Economic Transactions with the world, 1985-89 (an-
nual averages, billions of dollars)
Type of Flow United States Japan
Tradea
Advanced industrial nations $434.2 (63.7%) $215.4 (56.5%)
Third World 247.9 (36.3) 165.6 (43.5)
Latin America 88.9 (36.3) 15.2 (4.0)
Asia 119.1 (17.5) 111.0 (29.1)
Africa 16.7 (2.4) 7.6 (2.0)
Middle East 23.2 (3.4) 31.8 (8.3)
Total 682.1 (100.0) 381.0 (100.0)
Private Bank Loansb
Advanced industrial nations -2.4 (n.a.) 25.4 (69.2)
Third World -4.6 (n.a.) 10.8 (29.8)
Latin America -2.5 (n.a.) 4.4 (12.2)
Asia -1.5 (n.a.) 5.7 (15.7)
Africa -0.3 (n.a.) 0.6 (1.6)
Middle East -0.3 (n.a.) 0.1 (0.3)
Total -7.0 (n.a.) 36.2 (100.0)
Direct Foreign Investment
Advanced industrial nations 22.0 (76.7) 20.1 (70.0)
Third World 6.7 (23.3) 8.6 (30.0)
Latin America 6.0 (20.9) 4.6 (16.0)
Asia 1.0 (3.5) 3.5 (12.2)
Africa -0.1 (-) 0.4 (1.4)
Middle East -0.1 (-) 0.1 (0.3)
Total 28.7 (100.7) 28.7 (100.0)
Development Aidc
Third World 7.4 (100.0) 4.5 (100.0)
Latin America 1.6 (22.2) 0.3 (7.4)
Asia 1.4 (19.4) 3.3 (72.6)
Africa 1.0 (13.5) 0.5 (11.2)
Middle East 3.3 (44.9) 0.4 (8.8)
aExports plus imports
bMedium and long-term loans
cODA only
Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (US and Japanese trade);
OECD, Development Cooperation (US and Japanese trade); Coun-
try Exposure Lending Survey (US bank loans); Finance Ministry,
Annual Report of International Finance Bureau (Japanese Bank
loans); Survey of Current Business (US direct investment); JEI Re-
port 31A, August 11, 1989 (Japanese direct investment).
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Table 2. Japanese Trade with Latin America, 1950-89
Year Export Value Percent* Import Value Percent*
1950 $47.1mn 5.7% $67.1mn 6.9%
1955 185.6 9.2 243.4 9.8
1960 298.3 7.4 309.6 6.9
1965 457.9 5.4 707.9 8.7
1970 1,112.2 5.8 1,368.7 7.2
1975 4,667.0 8.4 2,510.0 4.3
1980 8,572.0 6.6 5,702.0 4.0
1981 10,119.0 6.7 6,595.0 4.6
1982 8,726.0 6.3 6,201.0 4.7
1983 5,902.0 4.0 6,368.0 5.0
1984 7,899.0 4.7 7,097.0 5.2
1985 7,753.0 4.4 6,188.0 4.7
1986 8,716.0 4.1 6,087.0 4.8
1987 8,151.0 3.5 6,221.0 4.1
1988 8,673.0 3.3 8,198.0 4.4
1989 8,837.0 3.2 8,639.0 4.1
*Percent of total (worldwide) Japanese exports/imports
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various issues.






























































































Source: MITI White Paper on International Trade, Japan 1990.
Table 4. Japanese Trading Company Offices* in Latin America by Country, 1990



















2 1 3 2
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0
1 2 1 0
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 .1I
0 0 0 0
5 3 3 2
Number of offices* 21 21 20 18 17 18 11
Number of countries 13 13 13 13 14 14 9
*Includes trading subsidiaries and representative/liaison offices
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Table 5. US Trade with Latin America, 1950-89
Year Export Value Percent* Import Value Percent*
1950 $2.8bn 27.2% $3.lbn 34.8%
1955 3.5 22.4 3.6 31.6
1960 3.9 19.0 3.9 26.5
1965 4.3 15.6 4.4 20.6
1970 6.5 15.0 6.0 15.0
1975 17.1 15.8 16.2 16.4
1980 38.7 17.6 37.2 15.2
1981 41.9 17.6 40.8 14.9
1982 33.2 15.6 39.5 16.2
1983 25.3 12.9 43.5 16.1
1984 29.2 12.6 50.1 14.7
1985 30.3 13.8 49.2 13.3
1986 30.6 13.5 43.9 11.3
1987 34.4 13.6 49.0 11.6
1988 43.6 13.6 53.7 11.7
1989 49.1 13.5 60.1 12.2
*Percent of total (worldwide) US exports/imports
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
Table 6. US Trade with Latin America by Sector, 1988
Goods Value Percent
EXPORTS FROM UNITED STATES $43,749.7mn 100.0
Foodstuffs 3,846.2 8.8
Raw Materials and Fuels 4,369.1 10.0
Light Industrial Goods 4,077.9 9.3
Heavy Industrial Goods 29,575.8 67.6
Chemical Goods (5,564.6) (12.7)
Metal Goods (4,468.7) (10.2)
Machinery (19,542.5) (44.7)
Non-classified 1,880.5 4.3
IMPORTS TO UNITED STATES 51,271.8 100.0
Foodstuffs 8,631.9 16.8
Raw Materials 1,848.1 3.6
Mineral Fuels 11,154.4 21.8
Manufactured Goods 27,853.6 54.3
Chemicals (1,694.6) (3.3)
Machinery (13,791.0) (26.9)
Metal Goods (6,394.0) (12.5)
Others (5,744.0) (11.2)
Non-classified 1,783.8 3.5_
Source: Department of Commerce, US Foreign Trade Highlights, 1988.
